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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ANASTACIO GALLEGOS, aka 
TED GALLEGOS, and 
JUAN RALLES GALLEGOS, aka 
RAY GALLEGOS, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
10109 
Appeal from Convictions of the District· court of Sa1t Lake 
County, Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action. The brother Appellants were 
charged jointly with Murder In the First Degree (76-30-3, 
U .C.A., 1953). 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury of 12 men: in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr. 
presided. 
The Appellants were convicted of the included offense 
of Murder In the Second Degree (76-30-3, U.C.A., 1953) and 
appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek reversal of the judgments and 
dissmal of the informations, or, that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about the hour of 12:30 a.m., August 11, 1963, on 
the sidewalk near the Annex Bar, 666 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, Raul Yanes was killed as a result of 
having been stabbed. 
Mike Hoopiiana was the sole eye witness to testify to 
the scuffle (T. 182) which resulted in death. He testified 
that he thought (T. 181) it was the Appellant, Juan Ralles 
Gallegos, hereinafter to be referred to as Ray, who held 
him at knife point to stay out (T. 181) of the scuffle (T. 
181) around the corner (T. 190) between Yanes and whom 
he thought (T. 183) to be the Appellant Auastacio Galle-
gos, hereinafter to be referred to as Ted. 
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Hoopiiana testified that he didn't see how the scuffle 
started (T. 190) but that towards the end of it he thought 
(uot too sure: T. 183) it was Ted who stabbed Yanes 
in the heart (T. 182) three times (T. 184) and Ray 
\\'ho stabbed him in the back (T. 204), from 4-6 feet away 
(T. 182). from a distance beyond where his arms could ex-
tend (T. 188), while 2 or 3 other idle possessors of knives 
stood as closely by as himself (T. 188) but did nothing (T. 
184) and were not identified by him (T. 189), although the 
same circumstances and powers of perception were pres-
ently available in equal proportion for him to observe the 
others as well as Appellants.) (T. 189) Actually Yanes had 
but 2 tvounds, with none in the back. Hoopiiana \Vas con-
fused and dru,nk ('I'. 191); took but one glance (T. 189); 
saw no faces (T. 183), no marks of identity (T. 189), etc., 
as is to be noted in more detail in discusion of Point II. 
The state relied on a Dick Je~ome being with the Ap-
pellants that night (T. 111). Hoopiiana knows him (T. 189) 
but gave no identifying testimony of his being present. If 
he had been there he would have seen him (T. 189). 
Jerome~ y·anes and both Appellants are Mexicans; 
Hoopiiana is Hawaiian; and all had been to some of the 
same bars (El Prado, etc.); but Appellants were steadily 
employed (Ray at Hill Air Froce Base and Ted a barber) 
\vhile Hoopi~ana was an unemployed felon on parole and 
Yanes on welfare. 
Hoopiana testified that he entered the Annex Bar after 
Yanes was stabbed (T. 184) to get his mind straight 
(T. 204) before walking away from his positively dead 
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friend (T. 204) on his way to the Blackhawk Lounge to 
establish his alibi (T. 192) 
Hoopiiana, though unemployed, (T. 186), still had a 
valuable friend in his dedicated lawyer who has served 
him so well, for so long, for so little. He called 
him Sunday evening )almost 24 hours after Yanes 
\va.:; killed) and \Vas advised he could be charged with mur-
der (ri'. 196). At that time Hoopiiana did not tell his lawyer 
that the Appellants had knifed Yanes (T. 210). An appoint-
rnent for the next morning was made between the two, the 
result of which was (for the first time)Hoopiiana pointed 
the finger of blame toward the Appellants (as his bar-
gained-for consideration, in return for p/romises from the 
law enforcement agencies: of exoneration for his implica-
tion in the death and his flight from the scene to conceal 
such; termination of his parole; and his feeling of import-
ance and acceptance by those in authority, who had hereto-
fore chased, caught, convicted and condemned him 
throughout his crime-crowded life. (Hoopiiana must have 
im1nediately recognized his "take" to be in excess of the 
paltry, proverbial 30 pieces of silver. God's mills turn 
slowly. But not His people.) 
Other pertinent facts shall be referred to as they be-
come applicable to the points of law hereinafter discussed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR RESULTED IN DENIAL 
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY OMISSION OF ELE-
MENT OF INTENT FROM VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGH-
TER IN INSTRUCTION NO. 11. 
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The trial court's given Instruction No. 11, to which the 
appellant excepted (T. 287), stated the necessary elements 
to be proved for a guilty verdict of voluntary manslaugh-
ter, an included offense charged. In short effect, those 
elements are listed below: 
1. 0 • 0 defendants killed the deceased . 
20 ... killing was unlawful ... 
3. . . . killing was voluntary upon a sudden 
quarrel or in the heat of passion ... 
4 .... killing. was without malice ... 
Voluntary 1\fanslaughter is defined in 76-30-5, U.C.A., 
1B5:3, as being the unlawful killing of a human being with-
out malice upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat o~ pas-
sion. 
This statutory definition is but declaratory of the com-
mon law. At common law, to constitute voluntary man-
slaughter the killing must be willful or intentional, or there 
must exist an intention at least to do great bodily harm.· 
The intention may be inferred from the use of a deadly 
weapon or from other and additional evidence. (29 C. J. 
1128. Sec. 116, and cases cited; 13 R.C.L. 785, Sec. 90, and 
cases cited. May be inferred or not, intent must be an ele-
ment to be present before guilt. 
Our statute was copied frorp California, where it has 
heen held that in order to constitute voluntary manslaugh-
ter, the intent to kill n~rust exist. (People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 
App. 293, 299 Po 742.) In construing an identical statute, 
the Supreme Court of Arizona held that an intent to kill 
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\\-as a necessary element of voluntary manslaughter. 
(Harding v. State, 26 Ariz. 334, 225 P.482.) 
This court held in State v. Cobo, 90 U. 89, 60 P.2d 952, 
cited in 26 Am. Jur. 167, fn. 11 and in 44 Words and 
[Jhrases 412, that the omission. from the instruction on vol-
untary rnanslaughter that the killing must have been will-
ful or intentional, or that death must have been the result 
of willful and intentional infliction of great bodily harm, 
amounted to prejudical error, notwithstanding the defini-
tion in another instruction of voluntary manslaughter as 
the intentional killing upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat 
of passion, and notwithstanding the failure of counsel to 
E;xcept thereto. 
Although, relative to the failure to except (or request), 
the rule of the Cobo Case, supra, has become more strin-
gent, (State v. Mitchell, 3 U. 2d 70, 278 P.2d 621, (8)) its 
requirement that the killing be intentional remains firm. 
(State v. Trujillo, ____ U. ____ 214 P.2d 634 (8); (State v. Jen-
sen, ____ U. ____ ; 236 P.2d 448 (8) ). And it is supported by the 
great weight of authority, e.g.: 
Pixley v. State, 203 Ark. 42, 155 S.W. 2d 713; State 
v. Clark, Mo. Sup., 111 S.W. 2d 101; State v. Carter, 
345 Mo. 74, 131 S.W. 2d 546; Comm. v. Lisou;ski, 
274 Pa. 222, 117A. 794; Comm. v. Guida, 208 Pa. 
370, 148A. 501; State v. Heinz, 223 Iowa 1241, 275 
N.M. 10, 114A. L. R. 959; Mixon v. State, in 7 Ga. 
App. 805, 68 S.W. 315; Hawpe v. Comm., 234 Ky. 7, 
27 S.W.2d 394; Harrington v. State, 83 Ala. 9, 3 So. 
425; Ketring v. State, in 209 Ind. 618, 200 N.E. 212; 
State v. Pond, 125 Me. 453, 139A_. 572; United States 
v. King, 34 F. 302, 309; State v. CrawfoTd, 66 W.Va. 
114, 66 S.E. 110; I Wharton's Criminal Law and 
Procedure 580-583, citing many cases. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
The trial court's given Instruction No. 12 states that 
the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary, natur-
al and probably consequences of his voluntary acts, though 
no definition of the word voluntary appears anywhere 
throughout the instructions. 
By that, are we to presume a necessary element 
(intent to kill) without proof beyond a reasonable doubt? 
Hardly! All presumptions, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, not guilt. Evidence is necessary to 
prove intent et al elements of a crime. And the jury may 
infer ... not not presume ... 
Or, are we led to presume that the words voluntary 
and intentional or willful are synonomous? Precisely not! 
Neither are the words presumption and inference 
synonomous. 
Moreover, notwithstanding presumptions, infere~ces, 
etc., the intent to kill remains a necessary element for vol-
untary manslaughter. Instruction No. 11 fails to so include 
it; instead, the element voluntary stands alone with respect 
volition. This will not suffice. 
In eve·ry cri1ne, there must be an act and intent or 
criminal negligence. Involuntary manslaughter applies 
to the criminal negligence aspect of this fundamental law. 
But voluntary manslaughter requires the application of 
intent. The matter, really. is that elementary. 
Intent. being son1ewhat syonomous with willful and 
designed. does not mean merely voluntary with respect to 
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voluntary n1anslaughter. It means more. In a penal sense it 
rneans with a bad purpose (JJ;Jiller v. State, 3 Okla. Cr. 575, 
102 P. 948), a free exercise of the will, done by design and 
v1ith a purpose. (Murphy v. State, 31 Ind. 511, 513.) It 
1neans something more of determination to execute one's 
own will in spite and defiance of the law than voluntary. 
(State v. Alexander, S.C., 14 Rich. Law, 247, 254.) Malice 
aforethought necessarily includes the idea that rnurder was 
D result of the voluntary act of the defendant. (Vernon's 
Ann. C.C.P., Art. 410; Crutchfield v. State, 110 Tex. Cr. R. 
420, 10 s.w. 2d 119, 120.) 
"H' ill fully means something more than a voluntary act, 
and more than an intentional act done with a wrongful 
purpose, or with a design to injure another, or one commit-
ted out of mere wantoness or lawfulness. (People v. Gillies, 
109 N.Y.S. 945, 946; 57 Misc. 568.) 
Voluntary manslaughter is committed suddenly (30 sec-
onds: T. 190) and repels the supposition that it is the result 
of premeditation or a prearanged plan to kill, but necessar-
ily involves the intention to deprive another of life. The de-
sign to kill is a distinguishing characteristic of voluntary 
and involuntary manslaughter .. A.lthough, of course, the act 
resulting ini death must have been voluntary, the death 
itself must have been willful and intentional for voluntary 
rnanslaughter (1 Wharton's Crin1inal Law and Procedure 
582, 583.) ' 
An essential of voluntary manslaughter is a willful 
and intentional killing, or the willful and intentional inflic-
t ion of great bodily harm resulting in death. As is seen, the 
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court's given Instruction No. 11 wholly eliminated that 
essential and dominant element of voluntary manslaugh-
ter. (Cobo case, et al, supra.) 
True, intent may be inferred from the use of a deadly 
weapon or (knife). In the court's given Instruction No. 11, 
the lower court spoke of a voluntary killing (not voluntary 
act of use of knife) but made no statement of what intent, 
as to injury to the victim or death to the victim, might be 
inferred from the use of that deadly weapon. There is dan-
ger in such an instruction. It tends ot lead the jury to be-
lieve that an intention to kill, as distinguished from an 
intention to do great bodily harm, of necessity, places the 
offense in the class of first degree murder, rather than 
n1anslaughter. (State v. Trujillo, ____ U. ____ 214 P.2d 634) 
In the instant case, Yanes was killed voluntarily (T. 
182) upon a sudden (T. 180, 181) quarrel (T. 182 ... 
··Hello, Raul," ... in an angry voice.) or in the heat of 
passion (T. 183 ... scuffle ... ) with provocation such as 
would give rise to irresistible passion in the mind of a 
reasonable man. (State v. Calton, 5 U.451, 459, 16 P. 902, 
rev'd. on another point in 130 U.S. 83, 32 L.#d. 870, 9 S. Ct. 
435) as we consider the beatings (T. 90, 91), fights (T.111) 
and guarrels (T. 111). The trial court thought same to be 
a jury question, or it would not have instructed on volun-
tary manslaughter (as it did not on involuntary man-
slaughter.) 
Had the jury been properly instructed concerning the 
intent ... the verdict might well have been less than mur-
der in the second degree-reduced to at least voluntary · 
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n1anslaughter-or even all the way to not guilty-had 
the state been put to its proper burden of proof requiring 
an intent to kill rather than a mere voluntary act, which 
could be simple or gross negligence ... anything short of 
total loss of self control, really. 
In circumstances where the court's instructions might 
lead to different results, the instructions are inherently 
defective and erroneous (State v. Waid, ____ .U. ____ , 67 P.2d 
652) and constitute prejudicial error, dictating reversal of 
the judgment of the lower court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
l.ANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUC'TION NO. 1 ON DEFI-
NITION OF KINDS OF EVIDENCE. 
Mike Hoopiiana testified that he was an eye witness 
to the stabbin'g of the deceased (T. 182). 
None of the other nineteen witnesses for the state, 
nor any of the seven witnesses for the Appellants, testifi-
fied directly of his own personal perception of any of the 
main facts to be proved. 
It might be conceived that some of the testimony o~ 
Hoopiiana could be classified as being direct evidence; 
\Vhile, all other testimony and exhibits would be circum-
stantial evidence, from which the ultimate facts in dispute 
must be inferred if proved. 
The above distinction between direct and circumstan-
tial evidence is sometimes drawn; however, in a more 
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realistic sense, no evidence is admissible in a court of jus-
tice that does not depend more or less on circumstances 
for credit. (I Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11, 12 and 13, 
fn. 19, citing (CO?nm. v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269.) 
It is elementary that the jury is the trier of facts, 
v;hich makes it apparent that it must deliberate on evi-
dence. Consequently, for the jury to deliberate in a fair 
and meaningful manner to insure constitutional safeguards 
to those standing trial for their very lives for first degree 
n1urder, the trial court has the duty to instruct adequately 
the jury on the law applicable to the particular fact situa-
tion being tried and the required manner in which the jury 
ntust so conduct itself. 
Necessarily, the court must instruct the jury with legal 
definitions of terms used, which includes the term evidence, 
and supply the jury (for its deliberation) with a ("Mapp 
to") guide for the application of those terms. 
Notwithstanding that many of the trial court's instruc-
tions included such terms as evidence, ci.rcumstances, 
facts, inferences, presu1nptions and combinations of those 
et al, not only did the trial court fail to give the Appellants' 
Requested Instruction No. 1, which defined evidence and 
supported the Appellants' theory of defense, but also, the 
trial court failed to instruct at all with respect to this bas-
ically required principle of the law. Appellants' Requested 
Instruction No. 1 read: 
I~STRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that evidence is of two 
kinds: direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is 
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where a witness testifies of his own personal knowl-
edge of the main fact or facts to be proved. Circum-
stantial evidence is proof of certain facts and cir-
cums~ances in a certain case, from which the jury 
may Infer other and connected facts which usually 
and naturally follow according to the common ex-
perience of mankind. 
Circumstantial evidence is competent, and may 
be regarded by the jury in all cases. It should have 
its just and fair weight with you. You are not to 
fancy situations or circumstances which do not ap-
pear in the evidence. You are to make only those 
just and resonable inferences from the circun1-
stances proved which the guarded judgment of a 
reasonable man would ordinarily make under like 
circumstances. 
If, in connection with the other evidence before 
you, you have no reasonable doubt as to the de-
fendants' guilt or the guilt of either defendant, you 
should convict them or him, whichever your delib-
erations dictate. But, if you entertain a reasonable 
doubt, you should acquit them or him, whichever 
your deliberations dictate. 
To warrant a conviction on circumstantial ev-
idence, each fact necessary to establish the guilt of 
the accused must be proved by competent evidence 
beyond reasonable doubt. And the facts and circum-
stances proved must not only be consistent with 
the the guilt of the accused, but they must be incon-
sistent with any other reasonable hypothesis or 
conclusion than that of guilt to product a moral 
certainty that the defendants, or either of them, 
committed the offense. If the facts of the case can 
be reasonably explained in a manner tending to es-
tablish innocence, even' though they can be reason-
ably explained in a manner tending to establish 
guilt, then you must, as a matter of law, find the 
defendants' or either of them, not guilty. (3 vVhar-
ton's Criminal Evidence, 473-477). 
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Without the jury having adequate instruction from the 
trial court, how are the Appellants assured of their consti-
tutional rights to due process to a fair and in1partial trial 
hy jury? Impossible! Without a common framework within 
which to function, there humanly results twelve scattered, 
~~elf-satisfied minds (con~)fuRed together in their attempt to 
determine the fate of the accused. Russian Roulette! 
Let us for a moment illustrate just how very much of 
even Hoopiiana's testimony is of the nature of circu'lnstan-
tial evidence, rather than direct, as first impression would 
dictate, in an effort to show the need for such as the re-
quested instruction to help the jury to decide what weight 
should be given different kinds of evidence, pres1tmpt'ions, 
inferences, facts, circ,wrnsta,nces, etc. 
Does any of the following excerpts from the testimony 
of Hoopiiana indicate that he is testifying directly of his 
ov;n preception as to the main facts to be proved? Of course 
not! ~lost of his conclusions are based on other circum-
stances or inferred from the facts not ultimate themselves 
to \\~arrant proof of required elements . 
. . . running footsteps fron1 behind (T. 180, 181) ... 
smneone ... (at the time I thought to be Ray) had 
a knife and told me to stay out of it (T. 181) ... 
. . . Another boy (T. 182) ... at the time I didn't 
see his face (T. 183) ... just a hat (T. 190), a derby 
(T. 206); not the only one Ted ever wore (T. 241); 
\\·as wearing that very night at the El Prado 
Bar (T. 238); was wearing when he surrendered 
himself to the officers ( T. 231); \vas taken as evi-
dence (T. 231); was shown to me by the prosecuting 
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attorney to identify; not the one I saw the night of 
the stabbing (T. 190); was attempting to be sup-
pressed (T. 241), but was finally admitted (T. 
242, to save the prosecutor being called as a 
witness to prove right the very matter which he 
was so adamently resisting (T. 241, 242) ... 
. . . I thought it Ted ... said, "Hello, Raul," in an 
angry voice, scuffled and stabbed him in the heart 
(T. 182) ... 
. . . I see the knife go into Raul's chest, I thought, 
three times ... (T. 189) 
. . . didn't see how the scuffle started . . . lasted 
about 30 seconds ... around the corner (T. 189) 
. . . not too sure . . . pretty scared . . . didn't see 
what he did with the knife at all (T. 183) . . . 
. . . was drunk (T. 191-fifth of bourbon) .. . 
. . . was just looking at four or five knives 
kept my eyes on them all the time (T. 184) .. . 
. . . not very good look ... took one glance ... that's 
all ... eyes on knives only (T. 189) ... 
. . . don't know how many guys were there for sure 
as I moved sideways to creep out of there so as it 
wouldn't excite anybody, you know . . . kind of 
turned and walked slowly away, and then I looked 
over my shoulder, and they was standing there, 
about four or five guys standing around Raul. Then 
I went up to the Annex Bar . . . went in ... stayed 
not more than a minute and a half or two minutes 
... then walked out the door and down the street 
(T. 184) ... Raul was laying on his back ... those 
two guys that walked out (of the Annex) was look-
ing at him at that time. I walked by and looked at 
him (appeared dead . . . yes, sir) ( T. 185) ... I was 
positive he was dead (T. 184) ... I got into my car 
and went home. (T. 185, 192, 193, 204, 205.) 
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Note Carefully! Last question and answer or cross 
examination (T. 192): 
Q: Isn't it a fact, Mr. Hoopiiana, that rath-
er than your leaving then and going home, 
that you, in fact, went to the Blackhawk 
Lounge for the purpose of establishing an alibi 
if you were asked your whereabout that night? 
A. Uhm huh. I went out to the Blackhawk 
for a few minutes, yes. 
Q: That is all . 
. . . didn't volunteer any information at all ... kept 
rny mouth shut . . . I figured somebody else had 
seen it (T. 197) . . . I was positive he was dead 
(T. 204) ... \vhy should I get implicated if I didn't 
have to? (T. 197) 
After all, Yanes was Hoopiana's friend (T. 204), 
whom he left-positively dead on the sidewalk-
and just drove a\vay-into the night to establish an 
alibi. (T. 192). 
Why, of course, no need to get implicated-
until have to. t ... I figured somebody else had seen 
it (T. 197) ... I could be charged with murder (T. 
_______ ) 
... I thought afterwards if anyone had asked me I 
\Vould say I was either at the Blackhawk or at 
home because no one knew where I was. (T. 193) 
... I knew the barmaid at the Annex and had 
leaved to her (T. 207) ... while I got my mind 
straight (T. 204) ... to leave his posjtively dead 
friend to go to the Blackhawk to establish an alibi 
tT. 192) ... 
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. . . before alone causing Ted and Ray to get im-
plicated because of statements to police and prose-
cutor for a price: parole termination and not being 
implicated (charged with murder, as advised by 
counsel-(T. 196) ... and receiving the promise 
. . . that the well bargained for information 
would be kept a secret for as long as pos-
1'Jible, (T. 203) and no testimony to be given 
unless absolutely necessary (T. 202) . . . and 
when it became necessary at the preliminary hear-
ing, first time was purposely out of the county to 
avoid testifying (T. 187) and second time, bargained 
for no greater charge than second degree murder 
against Ted and Ray before testifying, (T. 214), 
even after being taken into custody to assure a p-
pearance. (T. 187) 
Death penalties stir the worst blemished con-
sciences, pronouncedly, when in conflict with doubt 
or truth. 
It is within the province of the jury to disbelieve eye 
tvitnesses and base its conclusions on the inferences to be 
drawn from circumstances. (People v. Collins, 117 Cal., 
App. 2d 175, 255· P.2d 59). 
Circumstantial evidence is admissable although direct 
evidence on the same point is also admitted. (Silverfork v. 
lJnited States, 40 A.2d 82, Off'd 80 App. D.C. 158, 151 
F'.2d 11). 
The jury should have been so instructed in the instant 
case. To leave the jury floundering without judicial guid-
ance in a court of law is decidedly prejudicial error to the 
Appellants. 
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POINT III 
TIIE TRIAL COURT ERRED COLLECTIVELY SUF 
FICIENT TO DENY APPELLANTS DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW IN GIVING ORAL INSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT 
WAIVER; IMPROPER WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS 
NOS. 9, 12, 16, 18 AND 20; AND IN IMPROPER RUL-
INGS PREJUDICIALLY HARMFUL TO APPELLANTS. 
A-Oral Instructions: 
The trial judge completed reading to the jury the 
\Vritten instructions given (T. 280); then he went forward 
to further instruct the jury orally (T. 281, 282) without 
stipulation or waiver, but on the contrary with appellants 
excepting thereto (T. 282), \vhen he told them to deliberate 
until 7:00 p.m. before eating (T. 282) and to return a ver-
dict ... (T. 281). 
The court returned the jury in an attempt to cure 
the error. (T. 284) 
Further oral instructions were given without stipula-
tion or waiver with reference to the possible "hung jury" 
(T. 289): however, no effort was made to leave the jury 
:tnrestricted in time for eating or deliberating. 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil P:roced'ltre, which in the 
in~tant matter are surely equally applicable to the trial 
of a criminal matter such as the one now before this court 
provides that all instruct-ions to the jury shall be 1vritten 
unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be 
g;\·en orally. or otherwise \Vaive this requirement. (Man-
c.~~tory!) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
The court instructs the jury on the law (77-31-31, 
U.S.A., 1953) it is to hear (77-31-32, U.C.A., 1953), and the 
written instructions given may be taken to the jury room 
(77-32-2, U.C.A., 1953). 
B. Prejudicial Rulings: 
The appellants moved for a dismissal of the infor-
mation at a time prior to the formal resting by the state, 
while awaiting the arrival of the state's last witness, with 
the full understanding that such motion was to have the 
same force and effect as if made following the state having 
rested. (T. 199). 
'l'he trial court denied the motion. (T. 200). 
The appellants incorporated the same grounds and rea-
sons in their similar motion which was stipulated and ap-
proved to be of effect after the defense had rested. (T. 200). 
Likewise, the trial court denied that motion (T. 200) . 
. It is contended by appellants that the trial court 
should have taken the respective motions under advise-
n1ent, to rule thereon after all the appropriate evidence 
has been admitted. Otherwise, prejudice is impliedly pro-
jected against the appellants as a foregone conclusion, ne-
cessitating a reversal of that trial court's judgment which 
was adverse to the appellants. 
It is impossible for the court to lay down the law to 
the jury on the facts (77-31-31, U.C.A., 1953) until the 
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court has heard the facts. By analogy, the court cannot 
lay down the law to the appellants until it has heard the 
facts. 
C. Given Instruction No. 9: 
Given Instruction No. 9 was excepted to as being 
in acordance with State v. Russell, 106 U. 116, 145 P.2d 
1003, re: specific intent to do great bodily harm, but not 
in full accord with State v. Thontpson, 110 U. 113, 170 P.2d 
153, and State v. Trujillo, ____ U. ____ , 214 P.2d 626. 
Both the Thompson and Trujillo cases are in accord 
with the Russell Case, supra, to the extent of " ... inten-
tion or design knowing the reasonable and natural con-
sequences that would likely cause great bodily injury" 
Lut both cases immediately following the word "injury,." 
insert the additional element by adding the words "or 
death," i.e. ". . . likely cause great bodily injury or 
death ... " 
The court's instruction was prejudicial in this aspect. 
I!. compelled the jury to find the appellants guilty or 
second degree murder because of their intending injury 
\\·ithout death (receiving a sentence of 10 years to life) 
rather than guilty of the lesser included offense voluntary 
Illanslaughter, because the court's instructions No. 11 re-
quired a voluntary death (whereby they would have re-
eeiYed a sentence of but 1 to 10 years). 
D-Given Instruction No. 12: 
Given instruction No. 12 was excepted to as Lcing 
too restrittive in that it in1plies that every accused \Vho 
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has violently assailed another with a dangerous weapon 
in a .manner likely to cause death ... is presumed to have 
intended to kill or do great bodily harm. 
Note how the court's given Instruction No. 12 includes 
the added element (or kill) for second degree murder as 
it confusingly conflicts with the court's given Instruction 
I\o. 9 as to the elements of second degree (injury only). Ab-
stractly, the discussed part of the court's given Instruction 
No. 12 is not to be challenged. However, it does not apply 
to the facts and other instructions of the case, e.g. intended 
to kill or do great bodily injury as compared with volun-
tarily killed (no mention of bodily injury). 
Nor does -~he court's given Instruction No. 12 provide 
a definit~on f9r. the jury of the word "assailed," there-
by leaving to. the lay jury no possibility of justifiable or 
excuseable .homicide in any conceivable manner. 
E. Given Instruction No. 15: 
·Given Instruction No. 15 was excepted to as being 
prejudicial to at least Ray in that there is no evidence to 
warrant the jury considering him as "aiding" ("assisting") 
or "abetting" ("encouraging," "advising," or "instigating"). 
At worst, he held Hoopiiana at the point of a knife 
to cause Hoopiiana to "stay out" of the scuffle. This 
amounts to "prevention," not "participation." Wherein is 
there shown in the entire trial any facts sufficient to war-
rant such an insinuating instruction. (Surely not just be-
cause Ray and Jerome had encountered Albo and the 
El Prada earlier the sa1ne night . . . and were seen later 
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with Ted walking in a southerly direction! True, the An-
nex Bar is to the south of the El Prado-quite a few blocks. 
It is also east. But there are many places to the south of 
El Prado, pray tell. 
F. Given Instruction No. 16: 
Given Instruction No. 16 was excepted to as being 
prejudicial because of its making mention of the word "de-
fendant'' (singular) in this joint trial of "defendants" 
(plural), and conflicted with given Instruction No. 3, 
\vhich instructs only in a manner when the word "defend-
ant=-'" (plural) is used. (State v. \Vaid, supra.) 
G. Given Instruction No. 18: 
Given Instruction No. 18 was excepted to as being 
prejudicial in that it improperly states that the word "will-
ful' is synonymous with the word "intentional," both 
in1plying "sin1ply'' a purpose or willingness to com1nit the 
act. 
Such is not the law as the words are used in the penal 
sense. 
··\Vilful'' requires a stronger de3ire than "inten-
tional,'' and "intentional" requires a stronger desire than 
··voluntary" which, likewise, should have been defined 
specifically before the use of the word be permitted to be 
used in given Instruction No. 12 to in1ply its being syn-
onymous ,,·ith "intentional." (See 44 \·V ords and Phrases 
page 412 and cases cited in Point I, supra.) 
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H. Given Instruction No. 20: 
Given Instruction No. 20 was excepted to as being 
prejudicial against the appellants because of the categor-
ical denunciation of the physical retaliation because of re-
ceiving a former injury . 
. A.s is obvious throughout the entire trial of the case, 
the state insinuated a motive of cold-blooded execution 
in retaliation for Ted having been beaten near to the point 
of death himself by another at Liberty Park the week be-
fore, wherein the deceased had participated. 
So had Albo, Far more than Yanes! Had revenge by 
death been the motive, why was Albo spared earlier the 
same evening? ( T. 111) 
The instruction emphasizes "retaliation" and "former 
injuries," and though subtly includes "revenging," still 
leaves the lay juror with no choice for "excusable" or "jus-
tifiable" homicide, some of which include "retaliation" in 
"revenging" ... a "former injury." 
The court prejudicially emphasized that, because of a 
reason to be human and not Godly enough to forgive after 
having been brutally beaten with ball bats, stomped, kicked 
and left to die, Ted and Ray necessarily had a motive to 
kill Yanes-because Yanes is dead, and reliable (?) Hoo-
piiana said so. (The same Hoopiiana who said he had given 
Yanes a ride to the Annex Bar-when he was already there 
at 11:00 p.m. (State's witness Martinez: T. 164) and 12:00 
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midnight (Defense witness Arenez: T. 244) just minutes 
before he ~as killed and those two guys .that walked out 
of Annex (T. 184) were looking at him.) Why were not 
Albo et al killed? Why were they not prosecuted for assault 
\\'ith deadly weapons? 
All initial injuries become for·mer to their provocatb/e 
successors. See homicides without penalty or fault '\vherein 
defilement of wife et al are at issue, wherein there has been 
no reasonable time for a sufficient cooling of passions, self-
defenses, etc. And it shall be seen that the instruction is 
too pointedly directed "toward Liberty Park," without con-
sideration for acceptable alternative routes of travel, other 
than those discreetly recommended by the state in its road 
sign instructions of one way travel for the jury to join the 
prosecution for their synchronized arrival at the preor-
dained point of destruction in the vehicle of immunity be-
cause of soverignty-with further assurance of no need for 
insurance. By our "guest"! 
Be our "guests"! ... until judicially appealing enough 
at the junction of justice to compel us to put 'er in RE-
\;-ERSE. 
CONCLUSION 
::~ The defendants haYe been denied due process of la'\v 
\vhich is guaranteed by our State and Federal Consti-
t:> tutions and Statutes. They have been deprived of a fair 
~· trial before an impartial jury. Their conviction is not sus-
~~ 
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tained by the evidence. The trial and verdict constitute a 
miscarriage of justice antl should be reversed. 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
410 Empire Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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